that all there is in the world is structure, removing any 'hidden' elements. Both forms offer suggestions for the most appropriate way of representing this structure: Ladyman has notably adopted the so-called 'semantic' or model theoretic approach, whereas Worrall, at least in his more recent work, has advocated the well-known view that the structure of scientific theories is represented by means of the theory's Ramsey sentence. Our aim in this paper is to explore this latter representation and we hope to indicate that it is more problematic than might initially be thought. In the present work we shall be concerned with the inter-relationship between the representation of structure in terms of Ramsey sentences and the further aspect of epistemic structural realism that has to do with the idea that the 'natures' of the underlying objects are in some sense unknown to us.
Prima facie the adoption of the Ramsey sentence as the machinery for expressing the structural content of the theory seems to provide a rigorous response to the issue of representing the "hidden natures" as well. Being an existential generalization of the original theory, RS can be reasonably seen as describing a class of realizers far broader than the one realizing the original theory. In the event that the class of realizers of RS were constituted by more than one n-tuple of items RS would be multiply realized. Since the available empirical evidence for each n-tuple of realizers is the same there is no way to choose any member of the class over the others and as far as our empirical knowledge is concerned RS can always be multiply realizable. Multiple realizability, thus, seems a way to express rigorously the idea of the structure being epistemically independent from the entities whose natures we are not in the position to know. The issue of multiple realizability features prominently in the history of the Ramsey sentence. We shall investigate this aspect of Ramseyfication and its significance for ESR. As we shall discuss, Lewis, (Lewis 1970) used Ramseyfication in order to provide a definition of theoretical terms and argued that multiple realizability should not be admitted on realist grounds. Thus he introduced a technical modification of the Ramsey sentence in order to block multiple realizability, but then in a later contribution rediscovered it as the bedrock of a 'thesis of humility'. Carnap, on the other hand, welcomed multiple realizability as a tool to express the openness of scientific theories towards change following new empirical information and formally accommodated it through the use of Hilbert's ε-operator.
Thus multiple realizability must be investigated in relation to Ramseyfication because what we understand as remaining unavoidably hidden to our knowledge depends in this case on both factors. More precisely, different choices in the formulation of the sentence can lead to different conceptions of the structure and, therefore, of what a multiply realizable Ramsey sentence treats as inaccessible to our knowledge.
The original strategy formulated by Ramsey and developed by Carnap is based on the adoption of two languages: A fully interpreted observable one -or O-language -whose descriptive constants label items with which we are perceptually acquainted, and a theoretical one, partially interpreted via correspondence rules -or C-rules -coordinating theoretical postulates -or Tpostulates -to sentences in the O-language. Assuming some viable distinction between theoretical and observable terms in the theory a structuralist would reasonably expects this approach to provide a sharp formulation for the idea that the structure corresponds with some theoretical content captured not by any single theoretical term but rather by their mutual relation. The multiple realizability stresses this aspect, conjoining it -as observed by Carnap -with a form of openness with respect to the growth of knowledge. Openness the structuralist welcome as part of her response to theory change. As we shall note, Hintikka's view on Ramseyfication in an explicitly declared, structuralist, perspective can also be seen in these terms. However, despite the clearly stated structural character of the position, this approach does not generate a viable form of realism.
Lewis's strategy, on the contrary, rejects the very idea of such a distinction between theoretical and observable. In this case, the terms replaced by variables are the ones whose understanding is problematic in the light of the scientific lexicon accepted at the moment in which the theory is formulated; thus the resulting sentence is still heavily loaded with theoretical content.
Our concerns here have to do with the structuralist element of Lewis's approach. In particular,
given his thesis of Ramseyan humility, multiple realizability can make sense of the idea of "hidden natures" but, as we shall indicate, it implies the rejection of the notion of law as natural necessity.
This may be an acceptable cost to some structural realists but it is a metaphysical cost nonetheless.
In order to address these issues we will adopt the following approach. The first section will explore the approaches of Ramsey, Hintikka and Carnap. What these approaches have in common is the adoption of the Observable\Theoretical distinction. We shall see that they do not offer any help to the realist, whether structuralist or not. The second section explores the evolution of Lewis's account. In this picture we can find undeniable similarities with epistemic structural realism but it is no longer clear how to accommodate the epistemic independence of the structure from the entities.
To conclude with a slogan, the Ramsey sentence seems to be too short a blanket for the epistemic structural realist: either it yields a position which is structuralist but not realist or a position which is realist but not structuralist.
Section I-Structures Without Realism

From the Very Beginning: Ramsey's Ramsey Sentence
As is now well known, Ramsey introduced his treatment of theoretical terms as existentially bound variables in his 1929 paper 'Theories' (Ramsey 1978, pp. 101-125) . The relevant understanding of theories is a form of what has come to be called the 'Received View', according to which a theory is represented in terms of a set of axioms, from which various theorems can be deduced, and related to the propositions expressing the 'facts to be explained' by a 'dictionary', taking the form of a series of definitions understood as equivalences (ibid., pp. 103-104) . In considering how one might explain the 'functioning' of theories in the absence of explicit definitions (within the system of facts) 2 , Ramsey noted that a theory is 'simply a language' which clothes the judgments given by laws and consequences, and which we can then use without having to work out these laws and consequences. Hence, ' The best way to write our theory seems to be this (∃ α, β, γ): dictionary.axioms ' (ibid., p. 120) where the α, β, γ are the propositional functions in terms of which the axioms are expressed. He goes on to note that, ' Here it is evident that α, β, γ are to be taken purely extensionally. Their extensions may be filled with intensions or not, but this is irrelevant to what can be deduced in the primary system. ' (ibid.) Interestingly, Ramsey continues by insisting that any additions to a theory, whether these be new axioms or particular assertions, must be made within the scope of the original α, β, γ. Hence such additions are 'incomplete' in the sense that they are not strictly 'propositions by themselves' but only with respect to the theoretical context 3 . This implies that the meaning of such an addition can only be given when we know to what 'stock' of propositions it is to be added, and once that is determined the meaning is simply the difference between (∃α, β, γ): stock.addition and (Ôα, β, γ):
2 He previously argues that although we can always reproduce the structure of a theory by means of explicit definitions, such a construction cannot adequately accommodate the way in which theories are effectively 'open' to growth and further development (since within such a construction, adding a new axiom would require changing all the definitions and hence changing the meaning of the theory as a whole). This was a concern of Carnap's as well, and as we shall see, he responded in a particularly interesting manner. in what appears to be a near-realist manner: a Ramsey sentence is, after all, truth-apt in that it implies the existence of classes of entities that realise it, even though it makes no commitment to the existence of a particular set of such entities (Psillos op. cit., p. 261) . However, the mere truthaptness of sentences has little if anything to offer to the realist, since certain kinds of anti-realist (van Fraassen for example) would happily agree with that. Furthermore, its capacity for delivering empirical knowledge does not depend on the truth of the original theory and its commitment is different from that of the latter. If Steven, Joe and Juha are in a room the claim "There is a bald male in the room with Juha" is true but it can be the existential generalization of both "Angelo is the bald male in the room with Juha" and "Joe is the bald male in the room with Juha"; only one of the original claims is true but the existential claim is true in both cases. Indeed, this is the nub of the problem: if the structural realist were to represent her ontological commitment to structure via Ramsey sentences, then her position is in danger of sailing too close to forms of anti-realism.
Furthermore, the use of the Ramsey sentence by the structural realist in particular has come under attack because of the so-called 'Newman problem'. As in the case of the sentence itself, this is an old issue, originally presented as an argument against Russell's form of structuralism and now dressed up in modern clothes (it has been revived through the work of Demopolous and Friedman 1995; for a recent discussion, see, for example, Psillos 1999, pp. 63-65) . The basic idea is as follows: if we know only the structure of the world, then we actually know very little indeed. The central point is a straightforward formal one: '… given any 'aggregate' A, a system of relations between its members can be found having any assigned structure compatible with the cardinal number of A.' (Newman 1928, p. 140) . Hence, the statement 'there exists a system of relations, defined over A, which has the assigned structure' yields information only about the cardinality of A:
'… the doctrine that only structure is known involves the doctrine that nothing can be known that is not logically deducible from the mere fact of existence, except ("theoretically") the number of constituting objects.' (ibid., p. 144; his emphasis).
The application of this argument to the structure given by science is straightforward: for any given aggregate, a variety of systems of physical relations is possible, yielding the required structure and the problem is how to justify the choice of one such system. One might try to pick out a particular system as physically 'important', in some sense, but then as Newman himself points out, either the notion of 'importance' is taken as primitive, which seems absurd, or it must be grounded on what Russell calls the 'intrinsic characters' of the relata, which undermines the very structuralism being defended (Newman op. cit., ; for a reprise of this point see Psillos op. cit.) .
In its modern guise, the problem impacts directly on the structural realist who uses the representational resources of the Ramsey sentence, because if all the non-logical predicates of a theory are Ramseyfied out, then the resulting Ramsey sentence is true, if and only if the theory has a model; but this is trivial. Now there are two things one can say about this: first of all, the structural realist will insist that she has no intention of Ramseyfying out all the predicates of the theory, only the theoretical ones. Even then, it has been claimed, if the Ramsey sentence makes only true empirical predictions (and gets the cardinality of the domain right) then it will be true (Ketland 2004 ). However, it turns out that this is too quick and that the relevant proof relies on assumptions that the structural realist is under no obligation to accept (Melia and Saatsi forthcoming). We shall not pursue this here, as our concern is that even prior to addressing the Newman problem, the epistemic strucutral realist has problems with her choice of how to represent the structure she is interested in.
Secondly, however, even if all the terms, theoretical and observable, are replaced with existentially quantified variables, it might be argued that what this yields is still worth considering. This is the line Hinitkka takes in his suggestion that the relevant structure is now effectively represented by the relationships between the second-order quantifiers and these can be revealed by adopting his 'independence friendly' logic. We shall consider this here because of the connection bewteen this formal framework and Carnap's work, as exemplified by the role of 'choice functions'.
Hintikka's Independence Friendly Logic: a framework for structuralism?
Although he adopts a different approach from Ramsey, Hintikka's work can also be understood as contributing to the debate over structuralism and how to represent structure. In fact the notion of structure is clearly framed in model-theoretic terms: structures are conceived as family of models, and theories are seen as claiming that certain structures are instantiated at some point in the world. What concepts can be brought in, by this procedure? After all there is nothing to specify which are the sets of values that are supposed to substitute the variables appearing in the sentence.
It seems we are just saying that "given something in relation to something, there is something else in some other relation to some further thing". Clarifying this point will involve an excursion into Hinitkka's views about quantification and will address our first point above.
It will be helpful to consider the following example:
(1) Every cat of the Colosseum has got a Roman citizen that feeds it.
In terms of first-order logic, (1) looks like
(1) is in other terms of the type ∀x∃y (x,y). (2) Now establishing if (1) is true can be represented as a game 5 : when Player one comes with a cat Player two has to provide the corresponding Roman feeder. If the Roman feeder can always be produced, (1) is true. Formally -for instance in our 1.1 version -Player One is represented by ∀ whereas ∃ represents Player Two 6 . Now notice that the claim that (1) is true in our metaphoric game amounts to saying that there is a strategy that allowing the player ∃ to win the game. Put in a more formal way there is a function f that associates with any occurrence of x an f(x) such that the sentence (1.1.) is true.
In other and more general terms, we are claiming that
It is important to observe here that game-theoretical notions are crucial within the architecture of Hintikka's logical theory. See for instance Hintikka 1996 Hintikka , 1997 Hintikka , 2000 . For the sake of our analysis this can be seen as a useful and natural clarifying expedient. The equivalence expressed by (I) allows one to bring all first order sentences into the so called Skolem normal form.
The function f is the Skolem function associated with the sentence (2) and the metaphor of the game helps to clarify the point that it is the interplay between the quantifiers that introduces it.
In other terms such an interplay corresponds to the introduction of a specific concept. Or, in other words, what we would call a concept (theoretical or not) in the debate about theories since it appears in the sentence with the same syntactical characteristics and we are explicitly adopting a purely extensional perspective. This appears to be what Hintikka. has in mind when he says:
'If quantifiers are construed as higher-order predicates or if they are thought to receive their meaning by "ranging over" a range of values or to receive it from the totality of their substitutionvalues, the kind of interplay of different quantifiers with each other that is codified by their associated Skolem functions remains unexplained.' (ibid., p. 304).
Observe that sentences like ∃f ∀x (x, f(x)) belong to the so called 1 1 -fragment of II order logic i.e. the class of prenex formulas in which the only second order quantifiers are existential quantifiers. This is the same class to which Ramsey sentences belong 7 . Anyway up to this point Hintikka's emphasis on the Skolem function as the true meaning of quantification does not seem to motivate completely the shift to a different logical framework. After all, the equivalence given by (I) is just ordinary logic.
Reflecting a little more on our game setting can help to address this worry. The "cat-feeding in the shade of Colosseum" situation can be seen as the kind of strategic interaction that game theory calls game with perfect information. What matters for our point here is that this means that at every point where each agent's strategy tells him to make a move, he knows everything that has happened in the game up to that point. Above, we identified the players of our game via the two quantifiers. Thus some mutual relation between the quantifiers should encode this characteristic of the game. The relation we are talking about is, of course, that of linear dependence. A quantifier Q 1 is linearly dependent on quantifier Q 2 iff the value of the variable quantified by Q 1 is dependent on the value of the variable quantified by Q 2 .In ordinary first-order logic, the dependence is expressed via the scope of the quantifiers: Q 1 is dependent on Q 2 if Q 1 lies within the scope of Q 2 .
Thus, to say that the value of the variables over which ∃ is ranging depends on the values of the variables over which ∀ is ranging, amounts to saying that the move made by ∃ at each point of the game takes always into account the move made by ∀ at that point . Now, we are interested in the games in which the actions prescribed to a player by his strategy are taken without knowing the moves of the opponent -in game-theoretic terms these are games with imperfect information. To maintain the symmetry with the preceding case our logic should be able to encode this element via some relation between the quantifiers. Such situations in fact can be represented by Skolem normal forms of the following type
, with g only depending on z.
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Thus even in this case we expect some form of quantification is instantiating a choice function 9 . But the pattern of quantification presented here is not first order. This is precisely because of the linear dependence that does not allow us to represent the simple fact that the value of a quantified variable vary independently from the values assumed by another variable. express more accurately these relations between quantified expressions, the trivialization cannot be avoided. Roughly speaking, we have a case of trivialization when, after replacing every T-term with existentially quantified variables, the structure of the theory becomes so broad that every domain of objects with the right cardinality can be a domain of realizers of the theory. In general Hintikka condemns himself to triviality because of his choice of conceiving of the structure in purely formal
terms. This suggests that a plausible notion of structure is one that embodies some content, at least if such a structure has to be expressed in a Ramsey sentence.
3 Blocking the triviality with explicit definitions and multiple realisability: Carnapian themes in structuralism.
This section presents a further development of Ramseyfication due to Carnap and based on a sharp distinction between T-language and O-language. We explore both its explicitly structural character and the indeterminacy that seems to capture the essential characterisation of this idea of hidden natures within ESR. Finally we explore the nature of its ontological commitments.
Carnap rediscovered Ramseyfication through his attempt to extend Craig's Theorem to type theory 12 . His interests, as in the case of Ramsey and differently from Hintikka, had no relation with any structural realist view. His formulation was concerned with two closely entangled issues: the 12 Psillos has dome more than anyone in bringing this work to the attention of present-day philosophers of science and a useful account can be found in (Psillos 2000) definition of theoretical terms (T-terms) within the framework of the received view of theories; and that of a strategy to accommodate the change in scientific settings via a stable partial framework.
According to the Received View a theory can be seen as a formal axiom system T. An extensional interpretation for descriptive constants of the system is provided by relating them, via The distinction between analytical/synthetic statements in the theory amounts to distinguishing what the theory tells us about the phenomena from statements acting as meaning specifications. In a broad sense the meaning of the T-terms and T-statements is taken to be a 13 See Carnap 1966, p. 267ff. 14 The problem of analyticity and in particular the strategy adopted to solve it, had its genesis within Carnap's interest in the foundations of mathematics, although we shall not discuss this here ( see Friedman, 1999 Let us now come to Carnap's solution to the problem of analyticity. According to the distinction introduced above, the theory in its usual formulation is translated into a non-interpreted axiom system T, expressed in a formal language L T ; this language is based on a suitably rich logical, mathematical and descriptive vocabulary. The partial interpretation of this calculus relies on a set of C-rules that is designed to assign to the descriptive terms of T a factual content expressed in the observational language L O . For the present purpose, L O is assumed to be an extended observational language; where extended means that the language contains together with the descriptive O-constants, the entire vocabulary of mathematics and high order logic or settheory 20 and not only the usual first order logic.
At this point, taking the conjunction of both sets of postulates, the translation can be presented as follows: The sentence so obtained is formulated in the observational language, or, to be accurate, in the above mentioned extended observational language, which is "observational" because the only descriptive constants it contains are the observational ones. As Carnap emphasizes "the Ramsey sentence has the same explanatory and predictive power as the original system of postulates" 21 . The existential generalization preserves the epistemic virtues of the original theory: insofar as the factual content is considered, and the two formulations are empirically equivalent: it can be proved that every empirical consequence of TC is an empirical consequence of R TC 22 .
The Ramsey sentence introduced in this way is subject to trivialization exactly as in the preceding cases of Ramsey and Hintikka but crucially, given Carnap's solution of the problem of analyticity this is now a virtue since it grants that the only relevant content of the claim is the merely observable 23 . This in turn allows us to identify the synthetic content of the theory: the Ramsey sentence represents the synthetic content in the O-language.
Let P represent the factual content, let A T be the meaning postulates for the theoretical language and A O the meaning postulates for the observational language. A O contains only analytic truths because in the case of the descriptive O-constants, the distinction analytic/synthetic follows 21 Carnap 1966, p 252. 22 Let S be any sentence that does not contain theoretical terms. Then, This operator is a choice function: provided that the given class to which it is applied is not empty, the operator picks out an element of the class, precisely a representative of the class:
The first axiom states that if something exists that satisfies the open formula Fx, where x is the only variable occurring free, then ε x Fx is the ε-term that denotes an object that satisfies Fx. This object represents the formula or the set of objects corresponding to the formula. The second axiom states a form of extensionality for the operator claiming that if two formulas are equivalent, they have the same representative. Notice that if some x bears the property specified by F, the function chooses one of the members of the class captured by F but it does not specify how many elements there are in the class or which of these has been chosen. 27 Carnap, R., SBL in Psillos (1999b), pp. 167-8. italics mine. 28 It has to be emphasized that given the quest for an explicit definition, the answer in Carnap's approach has to be possible with the resources of logic and mathematics alone in the framework of the extended observation language. The choice for the use of the ε-operator is not the choice for a completely neutral logical device, because of the conceptual relation between this operator and the axiom of choice. Nevertheless it yielded the searched for definition with just the resources of a very powerful logic -the whole of set theory and mathematics-and in the observation language. Thus Carnap has performed his task meeting the requirements for the treatment of the theoretical terms he himself fixed in the " Methodological Now this claim can be expressed explicitly applying the first ε-axiom to R TC:
Since t = < t 1 , …, t n > , from (5) we can derive a schema to create definitions for each of the members of the n-tuple t 1 , …, t n :
Carnap showed 31 that it is possible to derive A T from A 0 T and A i T thus the new formulation of the theory is perfectly equivalent to the preceding one and via A T to TC and it allows an explicit definition of all the t-terms occurring in TC completely in an extended observational ε-language.
Let us now turn to the nature of these explicit definitions. As we have noticed above the ε operator provide an indeterminate choice over a class that can contain more than one element to be satisfied.
In other words, in the class of entities captured by the theory, in (5) An initial consequence of this situation is that if further empirical information has to be added it can be accommodated within the same framework. Thus the development which the theory undergoes can easily be absorbed:
this indeterminacy is just the one which we need for the theoretical concepts, if we use this explicit definition, which I used in my definition of t, because I defined t as the selection object which has the relation TC to o […] we do not want to give more because the meaning should be left unspecified in some respect, because otherwise the physicist could not -has he wants to -add tomorrow more and more postulates, and even more and more correspondence postulates, thereby make the meaning of the same term more specific than {it is} today"
32
Here, the key role is played by the idea of capturing a class of items all satisfying the theory;
roughly speaking we can say that further specification introduced to accommodate new empirical evidence will refine the characterization within the same class. Theory-change is thus accounted for via multiple realizability. The class of realizers is conceived in extensional terms. Now, the question arises, what kind of commitment 33 is partially specified by the multiply realizable n-tuple of terms defined via this procedure? In other terms does this multiple realizability allow a realist account of the hidden natures? We shall now argue that it doesn't.
Carnap's account equates the original theory TC to R TC & ( R TC ⇒ TC). Hence, the explicit definition of T-terms via the ε-operator is constructed out of a class of analytical truths. All we know about the realizers is true but has nothing to do with any matter of fact. The structure of the 32 Carnap, R., SBL , in Psillos 1999b, p. 171. 33 The focus being on the logical type to which theoretical notions belong, we can take terms to range over mathematical objects. Carnap states that there is no further commitment to the existence of something to which such functions should correspond or to the existence of the functions themselves. We can take theoretical terms as denoting mathematical functions. Physical magnitudes like, for instance, "[mass-density] maybe introduced, which have a value for every space-time point e.g. a real number. A function of this sort can be construed in our system by a function F of quadruples of real numbers. Here again, F is identical with a mathematical function of the same logical type […] it is not necessary to assume new sorts of objects for the descriptive T-terms of theoretical physics. These terms designate mathematical objects, for example numbers or function of numbers or the like which, however, are physically characterized, namely, so they have the relations to the observable processes established by the C-postulates while simultaneously satisfying the conditions given in the T-postulates" On this basis Psillos claims that Carnap's idea corresponds to an ante litteram form of ESR. (for Worrall at least) by certain equations in our theories, which are underpinned by epistemically 'hidden' natures. These structures are supposed to be a feature of reality that goes beyond the merely empirical, else structural realism will collapse into some form of (structural) empricism, as advocated by van Fraassen for example, But if the 'hiddenness' of the natures is represented in a Carnapian manner, through the use of the Hilbert operator, the attendant notion of structure appears to be entirely too 'thin' for realist purposes. On this view, we are not pointing to some structural element of reality to which the T-terms refer; rather, in adopting Carnap's strategy we describe merely the syntactic structure of the language of the theory. This is indeed a structuralist approach but certainly not a realist one.
Section II -Realism without structuralism
Multiple realizability, functional definitions and the Humility thesis.
Lewis also famously deployed Ramseyfication, but this time to realist ends. In the following we compare his use of this technique in two different contexts to emphasize how multiple realizability, as he understood it, can represent a feature leading to a realist view of theories, but one that is not appropriately structural in the sense demanded by ESR.
A functional definition of T-terms and the early rejection of Mutiple realizability.
Perhaps the most important discussion of Ramseyfication in the modern context, drawn upon by almost all recent commentators, is that due to Lewis (Lewis,1970) . In Lewis's view the theoreticalempirical distinction is to be rejected. The language of T is understood in natural terms as any other kind of language. The definition of T-terms is formulated via O-terms that in this case are terms whose meaning is acquired in scientific practice and thus is non-problematic 34 . The language is assumed to be made of names under the assumption that it provides enough copulas, thus instead of a predication as "F( _ )", we can have "__ has F-hood." The language is further endowed with nonextensional operators and connectives so in its O-vocabulary there are terms like "__because__"
or "__is a law that__" . Since we are dealing with scientific theories we assume that if any T-term is denotationless the theory is false. Nevertheless, the system of logic chosen to formulate the Ramsey sentence (namely, Scott's denotationless term tolerant logic) is designed to deal with denotationless terms. 35 Lewis's Ramsey sentence is designed even for intensional predication and is therefore very different in term of content from Carnap's. Lewis is after a definition of T-terms in a more or less straightforwardly realist fashion, therefore for him multiple realization is not a desirable feature.
Here is how he characterizes the formal machinery:
34 There is a concern one might have with Lewis's translation strategy. The equivalence of 'old' terms with 'well understood' and 'new' with 'problematic' is not straightforward. In particular this dichotomy does not take into account the role played by mixed predicates and relations in securing the empirical equivalence of the Ramsey sentence with the original theory. Our new language is very likely to contain problematic terms applicable at both the observable and the non observable level. If we replace them with variables some empirical content will be lost, but if we don't the choice has to be justified on different grounds otherwise we are retaining within our sentence some problematic term . 35 See Lewis 1970. (1)
(1) states that if T is uniquely realized then it is realized by the items named by τ 1 …τ n and, as
Lewis notices, it is logically implied from the Carnap sentence of the theory
(2) states that if T is not realized, then τ 1 …τ n names nothing, it is not a consequence of the Carnap sentence.
(3) states that if T is multiply realized then τ 1 …τ n do not name anything.
As specified above Lewis had to add a postulate stating that if the Ramsey Sentence is multiply
realized then it is false. Even with the introduction of intensional content the Ramsey sentence still maintains that character of indeterminacy.
Let us explore Lewis's concern with multiple realizability. A 'realization' of a theory T is simply a n-tuple of entities denoted by the theoretical terms of T and which satisfies the relevant 'realization formula' of T (obtained by replacing the theoretical terms by variables). Carnap allows for the case in which T is multiply realized and according to the associated Carnap sentence, the theoretical terms name the components of some realization or other. Lewis insists that this concedes too much to the instrumentalist view. Thus he demands that the theoretical terms of a multiply realized theory be denotationless. The idea is this: if the theory is uniquely realised, then the Carnap sentence does the job, in that it states that the T-terms name the entities in the n-tuple that constitutes this unique realisation. If the theory is not realised -as in the case of phlogiston theory, for example -then the Carnap sentence actually says nothing about the denotation of the T-terms.
But as Lewis suggests, it seems reasonable to demand that in such cases the T-terms do not name anything. (There is the complication of possible near-realisations, in the sense of an n-tuple that realises some theory obtained from the original one by some comparatively minor tweaking. In that case we take the weaker theory of which the n-tuples is the (unique) realisation and take that as the real term-introducing theory (ibid., p. 432).) Finally there is the case of possible multiple realisations, where there is more than one n-tuple realising the theory. In such cases, according to the Carnap sentence the T-terms name the components of one of these realisations but don't say which. To insist that the terms do not name anything or that they arbitrarily name the components of one of the realisations concedes too much to instrumentalism and furthermore, Lewis argues, scientists themselves appear to proceed with the expectation that their theories will be uniquely realised. Hence he concludes that in such cases the T-terms must be take to be denotationless and theoretical postulates containing such terms will then be false. It is this which motivates the use of Scott's denotationless term tolerant logic as the underlying formal framework and the prefacing of the relevant Ramsey sentences with the 'uniqueness' operator or ι-operator.
Does the possibility of multiple realizability really concede too much to the anti-realist? One might think multiple realizability (MR), construed epistemically, is reminiscent of the agnosticism underpinning van Fraassen's constructive empiricism (which, in the early criticisms at least, was often characterised as a form of instrumentalism). However, we should be careful here. Van
Fraassen's agnosticism is closely tied to the thesis of underdetermination, and the underdetermination here is that of theories by evidence so it is not a case just of the entities being different but of the theoretical predicates also 36 . expressing different properties that one of these realizers but not the other, realizes; that is that this sentence is a 'final' sentence in the appropriate sense.) The issue is, how are n-tuples to be distinguished if multiple realisation is to be a possibility in the case of scientific theories?
If both electron and smelectrons are supposed to satisfy T, then either T is only provisional and not final (as, we presume, most current theories are), in which case the difference in theoretical properties of electrons and smelectrons will be reflected in the replacement of T by its successor, satisfied by one or the other, or T is the final theory, in which case prima facie there should not be any theoretical difference. In the former case, MR appears to be merely a reflection of our epistemic fallibility and it is hard to see what we should be so agitated about. If, on the other hand, MR is to be understood not epistemically but ontologically, then how are we to make sense of it when all the theoretical properties of electrons and smelectrons are wrapped up in T? Can we really make sense of this notion of multiple realizability?
The Thesis of Humility
Interestingly enough, in one of the last papers he wrote (Lewis preprint), Lewis discusses again the issue of what we can know on the basis of our theories and his contribution seems precisely to address our last problem in a way that fulfils some of the desiderata laid down by advocates of ESR. The general context for the paper is Langton's analysis of Kant's transcendental philosophy as an investigation of the limits of our knowledge as a form of receptivity 37 . This analysis is grounded on a peculiar metaphysical thesis. Reality affects us perceptually and this affection is the ground of our knowledge. However, this affection is not due to the intrinsic properties of physical entities. On the contrary it depends on their relational properties. The genesis of the idea of a limitation in our capability to know reality is in Kant's disagreement with Leibniz regarding the relation between the intrinsic and relational properties of the entity. Whereas Leibniz took the latter to be reducible to the former, Kant thought they were irreducible. This allowed him to consider as non-influential the intrinsic properties of the entities with respect to their role in our knowledge and conclude that something is always "out of the picture".
In his paper, Lewis is after a defence of a form of the Humility thesis detached from the picture in which the relational properties are irreducible to the intrinsic ones. In his case what plays a decisive metaphysical role in expressing the sense of humility is a combinatorial principle applied to the properties of the entities concerned.
Here T is taken to be the final theory of science. The language of T is formulated following a strategy similar to his earlier work above but with a meaningful difference: T-terms label only fundamental properties (with the only exception of idlers and aliens properties whose consideration is not important here). We further assume that a fundamental property we refer to via a T-term always falls within a category containing at least two such properties.
Once our RS is formulated in the usual way, we have the following situation: the actual realization of T prima facie seems unique but the role-occupancy of the fundamental properties is specified by the RS which has the same empirical success as that of T and is multiply realized. This 37 The role of Kantian views in the history of structuralism deserves further discussion. Worrall's notion of 'hidden' natures is taken directly from Poincaré who was heavily influenced by Kant, of course.
means that in the case that T could be proved to be multiply realizable there is no empirical evidence that can decide between the different possible realizations. With regard to this form of humility two factors are crucial: a) T and its RS have the same empirical power thus RS can be taken to specify which role the fundamental properties have to play to account for all empirical data and this role is all we need for our epistemic purposes.
b) Since we assume that our fundamental properties belong to classes with at least two members, the combinatorial principle allows us to conclude that the same phenomena would be observable in worlds in which fundamental properties belonging to the same category are swapped. In other words there is room to argue that on this view, even the final T is multiply realizable.
The distinction between being the ground for a power and the power itself and the rejection of the reducibility of the latter to the former was the core of Kantian humility. What we will call with Lewis, Ramseyan humility is based on the possibility that our theories may be multiply realized. We can know that a role is occupied by a fundamental property and this is crucial in order to account for observable data, but we are not in the position to establish which property in a class of fundamental properties occupies it because the observable phenomena would remain the same whatever property in that class is chosen. The RS here plays the crucial role because its empirical equivalence with the original theory tells us precisely that once the role occupancy is granted the empirical outcome would be the same.
Let us now just touch on the metaphysical grounds for drawing this conclusion. The epistemic limitation depends upon a precise metaphysical picture: First of all, we have the assumption of combinatorialism: we can take apart the distinct elements of a possibility and rearrange them. Since there is no necessary connection between distinct existences, the result of such a combination will be another possibility. In general combinatorialism states that possibility is preserved under permutation of items and entails that the laws of nature are contingent.
Secondly, we have here a form of Quidditism, which is the view that properties have a kind of primitive identity across possible worlds (Black 2000) . Thus, different possibilities can differ only on the permutation of fundamental properties. This offers a further way of understanding the 'hidden' natures of ESR. As Psillos, for example, has emphasised (Psillos 1999) , the properties that feature in the theory's laws will be the relevant properties of the underlying entities (such as charge, mass, etc.), and hence, as French and Ladyman (2003) have argued, what remains 'hidden' will have to be something 'over and above' these properties, such as some form of haecceity. However, if we understand this 'hiddenness' via multiple realizability, as indicated here, we see that there is a further possibility according to which the epistemic structural realist's 'hidden natures' are cashed out in terms of the quiddities of the relevant properties. Not everyone would be happy with such a suggestion (see, for example, Bird forthcoming), but it strikes us as an interesting option to explore (although we shall not do so here).
Let us now summarise this second line of understanding the role of Ramseyfication. In his 1970 paper, Lewis took a particular realist stance which drove his rejection of (a form of) multiple realizability. Nonetheless, it is indisputable that the Ramsey sentence in Lewis's own version carries a highly theoretical load and the items featuring in the descriptions that the sentence provides are not only empirical or observational; the early worries of conceding too much to instrumentalism were thus too quick. Once rooted in multiple realizability the thesis of humility seems to have a strongly realist basis. Furthermore this thesis seems to ground the metaphysical principle of compositionality on the distinction among the elements of reality accessible to our knowledge and the ones that are not.
What about the consequences for epistemic structural realism once this perspective is embraced? First of all, Lewis repeatedly observes, the T-terms removed in this picture are a small number -as small as the number of the intrinsic properties, which in turns entails that this view admits in the Ramsey sentence a relevant amount of non-purely structural or relational knowledge although it frames it in a relational description, and this is true even in the version of the Ramsey sentence provided in the earlier paper. Secondly, the overall picture relies on combinatorialism which in turns pushes us to abandon a conception of laws of nature as involving necessary
connections. This in turn means that any articulated set of relational properties captured by the structure of the theory also loses any character of necessity. Now this may or may not be a heavy cost to bear, depending on one's attitude to laws and necessity of course. The epistemic structural realist could adopt some form of regularity view, although there might be concern as to how well this sits with a realist stance in general.
Alternatively, she could opt for some form of dispositional essentialism, as Bird advocates (forthcoming). Whatever options she settles on, our claim here is simply that dropping necessity introduces a further pressure on her position.
Consider: the epistemic structural realist holds, as a central thesis, that structure is epistemically independent from the underlying, and hidden, 'natures'. Now, one can argue that this epistemic distinction must be based on some metaphysical distinction: putting it rather crudely, if structure can be known and 'natures' not, then there must be some difference in their metaphysical characteristics which underpins this. The source of the difference can lie with the 'natures' or the structures. One option, as indicated above, is to insist that what remains 'hidden' will be have to be something 'over and above' these properties. French and Ladyman (2003) have argued that this 'something' has to do with the entities' individuality, or lack thereof, and have drawn on the consequences of quantum physics for particle individuality to push for a shift away from epistemic structural realism and towards the ontic form. Alternatively, the epistemic structural realist could insist that it is with the nature of the structure that the distinction lies. And one way of articulating that would be on the basis of this structure embodying some form of necessary connection.
On the above Lewisian view, however, there is no necessary connection 'tying together' the set of properties represented in the laws. They just happen to come that way. And if we know the structure, then we know all there is to know about these properties and their interrelationships. But then the distinction between 'structure' and the 'nature' of the underlying entities appears to have become blurred and the emphasis now seems more on the idea of expressing rigorously some limitation on our access to reality. The suggestion, then, is that a cost of adopting the Lewisian picture would be increased pressure to locate the distinction between structure and nature with the latter and hence the necessity of facing up to French and Ladyman's arguments.
In general, then, within the above picture, multiple realizability can provide a rigorous way to define the idea of hidden natures but at the cost of admitting a great deal of non-relational content in the notion of structure, precisely the kind of content that caused the PMI-related problems.
Further, the structuralist seems now forced to pay for the characterization of the hidden natures with the money of the necessity of the laws. Of course, she may feel that is a cost worth paying, but it is a cost to be aware of nevertheless.
Conclusion
To make sense of epistemic structural realism, it is not enough that the structural dimension be appropriately represented -the idea of there being 'hidden natures' underpinning this structure must also be captured. Here we have explored some formal ways of doing this but they leave the structural realist with a dilemma: following Carnap, we get a nice representation of the structural element, but we lose realism, following Lewis, we adhere to the realist perspective, but we lose a standard understanding of the laws that the epistemic structural realist sets such great store by. This is not to suggest that these are the only ways to conceptualise Worrall's 'hidden natures' but the epistemic structural realist has yet to come up with a viable alternative.
